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Introduction   
Hobbes is famously critical of Aristotle’s politics, claiming that it is grounded in 
philosophical, metaphysical and scientific error.1    In particular, Hobbes challenges 
Aristotle’s idea that the` human good’ is embedded in nature and that political association 
is natural to human beings. 2  On Hobbes’ account, all human activity, including the 
construction of human goods can be explained best through his own `corrected’   
mechanistic-materialist, individualistic `science’ of human behavior.   Politics, Hobbes 
wants to demonstrate,   is the result of artificial covenant rather than of the natural 
outgrowth of political community.          
 
In this paper I propose that there   limitations to both the Aristotelian and Hobbesian 
model.  Neither Hobbes nor Aristotle   can explain adequately what one could consider a 
most basic and minimal human good – the perpetuation of the human species.  
Concomitantly, neither thinker can fully account for a most fundamental political 
imperative – the continuation of the political community.    
 
The limitations of both Hobbes and Aristotle centre on their description of familial 
relations.  Both use the claims of `science’ in the form of biological imperatives to depict 
relations between mothers, fathers and children.   However, neither is successful in 
demonstrating how these relations lead to a politics where, in Hobbes case, artificial 
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covenants ensure biological and political perpetuation of the species, or where, in 
Aristotle’s case, natural human bonds ensure that the good of the political community is 
furthered.   Although I focus more on Hobbes than on Aristotle in this paper,   I sketch 
out briefly the limitations in the Aristotelian account as well, to illustrate more clearly 
what is missing in each thinker.  My aim is to suggest that each requires elements of the 
other to provide a more complete account of   a politics that can supply the fundamental 
human good of political continuity.    
 
Hobbes on Reason and Science 
Hobbes’ depicts human reason as an activity that entails a succession of thoughts (mental 
discourse). 3 This activity can be relatively unguided, in which case it resembles 
dreaming. When it is guided by desires or appetites, however, it becomes more 
sequential.  Both humans and animals engage in the kind of regulated train of thought 
that seeks to find the means to achieve a desired effect.  But only human beings have the 
curiosity to seek to discover the causes and consequences of desired effects and to find 
diverse means to achieve desired ends.    
 
Another distinctive human activity is Speech which consists of using agreed definitions, 
or names, to signify thing and connecting them in a causal sequence - “For REASON, in 
this sense, is nothing but Reckoning (that is, Adding and Subtracting) of the 
Consequences of generall names agreed upon, for the marking and signifying of our 
thoughts; I say marking them, when we reckon by ourselves; and signifying, when we 
demonstrate, or approve our reckoning to other men. “4  Those things that are capable of 
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being named are the only things that can be taken as the subject of reason. These include 
(1) what is deemed Matter or Body (2) names by which matter and body are distinguished 
from one another (3) things that bring into account properties of our own bodies, which 
are derived from what affects our five senses. (4) Names of the names themselves.  5   
Hobbes emphasizes that the operation of human reason is the same, whether the tools or 
objects  of  reckoning are  numbers,  words , or `political entities’ - which are themselves 
only representations of words – “When a man Reasoneth, he does nothing else but 
conceive a summe totall, from Addition of parcels; or conceive a Remainder, from 
Subtraction of one summe from another; which (if it be done by Words,) is conceiving of 
the consequence of the names of all the parts, to the name of the whole; or from the 
names of the whole and one part, to the name of the other part.” 6  Reasoning becomes 
calculation in Hobbes  -  “ in what matter soever there is place for addition and 
subtraction, there is also place for Reason; and where these have no place, there Reason 
has nothing at all to do. “7  
 
Science is both the activity of reasoning and the end result of reasoning. Hobbes 
introduces it as a method that seeks the `truth’ by using agreed upon definitions of words, 
or speech, 8  and putting these definitions together in a causal order.  It is a way of 
calculating the relationship among things with the aim of causing and predicting desired 
consequences. – “And whereas Sense and Memory are but knowledge of Fact, which is a 
thing past, and irrevocable; Science is the knowledge of Consequences, and dependence 
of one fact upon another.” 9 The ‘truth’ that can be acquired as the result of Science is not 
absolute but conditional in the sense that it rests on making the proper logical connections 
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among agreed upon definitions.  Hobbes declares that “True and False are attributes of 
Speech, not of Things. And where Speech is not, there is neither Truth   nor   
Falsehood.“10   For Hobbes there is no outside reference point or Aristotelian `essence’ in 
Nature to which speech names refers. They are simply agreed upon definitions.    
 
Hobbes on Biology, Philosophy and Politics 
What moves human beings to activate their reason, or to engage in any activity, are their 
appetites and aversions, grounded in the biological body?  Both humans and animals, 
Hobbes maintains, are propelled by two sorts of motion (1) the vital or involuntary 
motions involved in bodily activity such as breathing and the (2) voluntary motions that 
propel towards something (appetites) or away from something (aversions).11   What 
distinguishes humans from animals is the ability to name their appetites and aversions. 
Most important  for Hobbes’ account of `politics’ is that  individual human beings  can 
and  do name what they desire as ‘good’ and what they want to avoid as ‘evil’. In the 
absence of  an agreed upon definition of names and words, it cannot be decided by 
reference to `Nature’ or a transcendental `essence’  what is ‘true’ and `false’, ‘good’ and 
`evil’.  These require an Arbiter or Judge who determines among conflicting definitions 
what  is  to be considered ‘true’  and ‘good’ through establishing  laws backed by 
punishment for breaches.  According to Hobbes, only a Sovereign Will with absolute 
authority has the power to establish and compel obedience to such laws. Such a situation 
by Hobbes’ definition constitutes `civil society’.  
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Similarly, the enterprise of Philosophy requires a common Arbiter or Judge, a 
characteristic of civil society.  Hobbes claims that from science comes wisdom and 
therefore philosophy – “By PHILOSOPHY, is understood the Knowledge acquired by 
Reasoning, from the Manner off the Generation of any thing, to the Properties; or from 
the Properties, to some possible Way of Generation of the same; to the end to bee able to 
produce, as far as matter and humane force permit, such Effects, as humane life required. 
“12   Hobbes’ own philosophy of politics, however, cannot provide a plausible or 
reasonable account of the generation of human beings.  
 
Hobbes is consistent in applying his framework of what constitutes human reasoning and 
the activity of science to politics.   All human behaviors and relations, whether, political 
familial, or social, according to Hobbes, can be defined as driven by similar biological 
grounded appetitive (and aversive) imperatives.    He uses the device of the `state of 
nature’ to demonstrative how individual human beings, without a Sovereign Will who 
can establish and compel obedience to civil law, are necessarily driven by their appetites 
and aversions to a condition of war of all against all.  This is a state where there is no 
industry or science. There can be no shared knowledge of `truth’ or `good’, since there is 
no common authority to determine what signifies an agreed upon definition of a thing. 
Indeed, if one works through Hobbes’ logic on the biology of reproduction, there is no 
guarantee that the human species can reproduce itself. It becomes a state where not only 
the life of the individual human being, but also the life of the human species is 
precarious.  
 
  
6 
The Hobbesian State of Nature 
According to Hobbes’ own abstract definition of the state of nature as a hypothetical state 
that can occur at any time, it is a condition in which is there is no common Sovereign 
authority to establish and compel obedience to civil law.  13  In this condition, sexual 
appetite may drive male and female to unite but it is unlikely that the male would remain 
with the female afterwards, or even acknowledge `paternity’ of common offspring.  The 
conjugal relationship is a result not of `nature’ or `biology’, but of civil law, Hobbes 
proposes.  Only in civil society, where a Sovereign Authority erects Marriage Laws, can 
one assume continuity in male- female associations.  14 In the state of nature, relations 
between male and female, and, more importantly, between adults and off-spring, are 
subject to similar imperatives as relations between strangers – competition, self-interest 
and a potential war of all against all.  `Generation’ or biological ties do not seem to 
guarantee or engender any unique sort of bond.  This emerges most clearly in Hobbes’ 
presentation of the dynamic between and a woman and her off-spring. 
 
In the `state of nature’, the consummation of male and female sexual desire may lead to 
pregnancy and birth. But, there is little justification, based on reason and science, for why 
the woman who gives birth would feed and care for the infant, thereby giving it life.  
Indeed, Hobbes asks whether she might not abandon it and leave it to another to find and 
nourish: 
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For in the condition of meer Nature, where there are no Matriomoniall lawes, it 
cannot be known who is the Father, unlesse it be declared by the Mother: and 
therefore the right of Dominion over the Child dependeth on her will, and is 
consequently hers. Again, seeing the Infant is first in the power of the Mother, so 
as she may either nourish, or expose it, if she nourish it, it oweth its life to the 
Mother; and is therefore obliged to obey her, rather than any other; and by 
consequence the Dominion over it is hers. But if she expose it, and another find, 
and nourish it, the Dominion is in him that nourish it.  15 
 
 
Using Hobbes’ own reasoning, based on his depiction of human behavior in the state of 
nature, it is likely that the mother would abandon rather than nourish the infant.  In the 
absence of an effective Law of Gratitude which compels individuals not to harm those 
who have conferred benefits on them, there is no guarantee that the child would not 
become the mother’s enemy.   There is even less incentive for a stranger to nourish a 
child in the absence of such a guarantee.  Since human infants are born dependent 
requiring the care of another to live, and one cannot assume that care is forthcoming in 
the state of nature, even the propagation of the human species is precarious. 
 
What’s Missing in Hobbes 
Several elements are missing in Hobbes’ biological scientific explanation for human 
behavior. (1) He briefly mentions a `natural inclination ‘of parents to their offspring. 16 
However this seems to manifest itself in the desire to increase one’s own honor and 
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power through one’s kin17 rather than a bond that ensures proper care for one’s offspring.  
There is no comprehensive account of a maternal or paternal instinct or desire to have and 
care for children or a moral relationship between them that exists outside of contractual 
exchange, that is a reckoning based on voluntarily pursuing one’s own interests or 
appetites.  More serious than the lack of paternal instinct is the lack of a maternal bond 
that operates outside of contractual considerations.  
 
(2)Hobbes makes few distinctions between male and female in their association with their 
offspring   Biological imperatives of conception, pregnancy and birth give the `mother’ 
knowledge that the infant is her `own’. They are also  give her the  first opportunity to 
have access to the new life – to exercise power that comes with the potential to nourish 
the infant, thus establishing dominion over it. However, absent in Hobbes’ description of 
male and female biology or behavior is any notion of a `natural’ maternal instinct or love 
of one’s own offspring. Infect, Hobbes presents women as having similar capacities for 
reasoning as men. Both sexes can calculate to kill another in the state of nature, if they so 
desire. 18  And, given the dynamics of the state of nature, it is likely that the woman’s 
reckoning would lead her to abandon rather than nourish the infant.   The distinction 
between abandonment and infanticide has little meaning in the state of nature. The 
biological fact that humans are born requiring nourishment from another to live means 
that the failure to provide such nourishment is akin to causing death.   Furthermore, 
infanticide carries no moral condemnation in a state of nature, since what is `good’ and 
`evil’ are meaningless in the absence of agreed upon definitions.    
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(3) There is little concept of the uniqueness of biological ties or love of one’s own. 
Instead, familial relations, including relations between parents and children, are assumed 
to be as artificial as political relationships. The parent-child relationship, as Hobbes 
depicts it, is based on an artificial covenant, similar to the political covenant that 
generates a Sovereign Will in civil society.   A covenant requires that one party perform 
`afterwards’ their part of the contractual exchange of benefit.   Yet covenants are only 
active where there is a Sovereign Will to ensure obedience, found only in civil society.    
Generational continuity remains a problem in civil society to the extent that the family – 
as `private association’ is left unregulated by the Sovereign Will. As such the relations 
between parents and children are left to the exigencies of the state of nature – a 
competitive potential war of all against all. 
 
Aristotle on Biology and Generation 
Seemingly, Aristotle overcomes the limitations of the Hobbesian model in accounting for 
the perpetuation of the species and the continuity of the political community by fleshing 
out precisely what Hobbes attempted to delete.  (1)Aristotle grounds political community 
on a notion of male and female coming together in a natural association that unites their 
differences and propagates both the species and the political community.19 (2) He 
distinguishes between male and female as biological entities with distinctive relations to 
each other and to their offspring.20 (3) He emphasizes the moral uniqueness of familial 
relations in the household.  The natural affection between parents and children forms a 
bond that is even stronger in the mother than the father.  21 Knowledge of one’s own and 
the biological connection between parents and offspring generates a moral relationship 
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that obliges parents to care for their children’s well-being, thereby providing the 
foundation for political community and continuity.    
 
Limitations in the Aristotelian Model 
However, there are limitations to the Aristotelian model, which cannot be explained fully 
by Aristotle’s own account of   biology and science.  These limitations emerge most 
clearly when one considers his recommendations on infant abandonment.   In Book II of 
The Politics Aristotle provides a well-known criticism of Plato’s community of wives and 
children as laid out in Book V of TheRepublic.  22  Strikingly, Aristotle fails to take Plato 
to task for the proposal that infants who are `deformed’ may be exposed at birth.  
Furthermore, Aristotle proposes that laws stipulating that `deformed’ infants by exposed 
are necessary for the well-being of the community. 23  As well, he recommends laws that 
support inducing `miscarriage’ in early pregnancy for the purpose of regulating 
population growth.   However, these recommendations contradict and challenge his 
claims about parental affection, in particular maternal affection.  If women are naturally 
inclined to love their offspring and care for them, more so than men, how does one 
explain how they would deliberately and willingly abandon their own offspring or induce 
abortion of their own potential offspring?  
 
According to Aristotle’s `science’ of nature, all things contain a potential end or `essence’ 
towards which they move.  All substances, including human beings, are in a state of 
becoming – moving from their potential to their final end, which forms the natural 
completion of their being.  `Deformed’ infants might presumably be considered to be 
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`against nature’ or nature’s mistakes if they are deemed incapable of fulfilling their 
`human’ potential. Yet, this justification for infant exposure is incompatible with 
Aristotle’s emphasis on the soul rather than the body as `true’ indicator of one’s nature.24 
 
The human good for Aristotle can only be fully developed through the political 
community which is deemed to be the `natural end’ of human relations.  For Aristotle, 
human reason is deliberative – it aims at the good, including the good of the political 
community. One might justify the exposure of `deformed’ individual infants on the 
grounds that it aims towards the greater end of the development of the political 
community, by generating a healthy citizenry. However, one must then deem `nature’ to 
have given women the deliberative capacity to `rule’ their instinct of maternal love for 
the good of the political community. Yet Aristotle is quite adamant that women’s 
deliberative capacity is not fully developed. 25  The biological distinctions he makes 
between male and female present a portrait of women as being `incomplete’ in this 
capacity.  
 
In both Aristotle and Hobbes, the mother- child association is of greater import for 
generational continuity than the father- child one.   Aristotle shows us what is missing in 
Hobbes – a notion of maternal love and care for one’s own. Hobbes shows us what is 
missing in Aristotle – an acknowledgement of the deliberative or reasoning capacity of 
women.  
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